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A CONSTITUTIONAL ACCIDENT WAITING 
TO HAPPEN 
Akhil Reed Amar* 
In the category, Most Mistaken Part of the Current Consti-
tution, I nominate the electoral college. The ingenious scheme of 
presidential selection set up by Article II and refined by the 
1\velfth Amendment was a brilliant eighteenth century invention 
that makes no sense today. Our system of selecting Presidents is 
a constitutional accident waiting to happen. 
I nominate the electoral college in part because some consti-
tutional scholars might tend to overlook its flaws. Constitutional 
Law courses typically stress courts, cases, and clauses that get liti-
gated. Despite the vast constitutional significance of the Presi-
dency, it is woefully understudied in law schools today. (It gets 
far more attention in political science departments-a vestige of 
the early twentieth century world in which academic study of the 
Constitution generally nestled in political science, while law 
schools stressed "private law" like contracts and torts.) Constitu-
tional Law scholars may likewise prefer to focus on clauses that 
can be "fixed" by creative judicial interpretation. The electoral 
college can be fixed only by a formal amendment, and talk of 
constitutional amendment scares many law professors. 
But amendment is exactly what is called for here; the rea-
sons that made the electoral college sensible in the eighteenth 
century no longer apply. The Framers emphatically did not want 
a President dependent on the legislature, so they rejected a par-
liamentary model in which the legislature would pick its own 
leader as prime minister and chief executive officer. How, then, 
to pick the President? The visionary James Wilson proposed di-
rect national popular election, but the scheme was deemed un-
workable for three reasons. First, very few candidates would 
have truly continental reputations among ordinary citizens; ordi-
nary folk across the vast continent would not have enough good 
information to choose intelligently among national figures. Sec-
ond, a populist Presidency was seen as dangerous-inviting dem-
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agoguery and possibly dictatorship as one man claimed to 
embody the Voice of the American People. Third, national elec-
tion ~ould upset a careful balance of power among states. Since 
the South didn't let blacks vote, southern voices would count less 
in a direct national election. A state could increase its clout by 
recklessly extending its franchise-for example, if (heaven for-
bid!) a state let women vote, it could double its weight in a direct 
national election. Under the electoral college system, by con-
trast, a state could get a fixed number of electoral votes whether 
its franchise was broad or narrow-indeed, whether or not it let 
ordinary voters pick electors. 
None of these arguments works today. Improvements in 
communications technology, and the rise of political parties, 
make possible direct election and a populist Presidency-de 
facto, that is our scheme today. Blacks and women are no longer 
selectively disenfranchised, and states no longer play key roles in 
defining the electorate or in deciding whether to give the voters a 
direct voice in choosing electors. Direct national election would 
encourage states to encourage voters to vote on Election Day; 
but today, this hardly seems a strong reason to oppose direct 
election. 
Ingenious, indirect, sophisticated arguments made on behalf 
of the electoral college by clever theorists these days are le-
gion-but almost all are make-weight: If the scheme is so good, 
why doesn't any U.S. state, or any foreign nation, copy it? A low 
plurality winner in a three- or four-way race is possible even with 
the electoral college; and could be avoided in a direct national 
election by single transferable voting (with voters listing their 
2nd and 3rd choices on the ballot, in effect combining the "first 
heat" and "run off" elections into a single transaction). 
The only two real arguments against abolition of the electo-
ral college sound in federalism and inertia. Only federalism can 
explain why we should use an electoral college to pick presidents 
but not governors. But it's hard to see what the federalism argu-
ment is, today. The specter of the national government adminis-
tering a national election, I confess, does not give me the cold 
sweats. A razor-thin popular vote margin might occasion a na-
tional recount, but states now manage recounts all the time, and 
new technology will make counting and recounting much easier 
in the future. (And today, a razor-thin electoral college margin 
may require recounts in a number of closely contested states 
even if there is a clear national popular winner.) 
1995] SYMPOSIUM 145 
Inertial, Burkean, arguments take two forms. First, the ar-
gument goes, a change in presidential selection rules would radi-
cally change the game in ways hard to foresee. Candidates 
wouldn't care about winning states-only votes-and campaign 
strategies might change dramatically and for the worse. But it's 
hard to see why; given that, historically, the electoral college 
leader has also tended to be the popular vote leader, the strategy 
for winning shouldn't change dramatically if we switch from one 
measure to the other. This sets up the second inertial point. The 
dreaded specter of a clear popular loser becoming the electoral 
college winner hasn't happened in this century: "Why worry?" 
But that's what someone might say after three trigger pulls in 
Russian Roulette. One day, we will end up with a clear Loser 
President-clear beyond any quibbles about uncertain ballots. 
And the question is, will this Loser/Winner be seen as legitimate 
at home and abroad? If our modern national democratic ethos, 
when focused on the thing, would balk at a byzantine system that 
defies the people's choice on election day, true Burkean theory 
would seem to argue against the electoral college. If We the Peo-
ple would amend the Constitution after the Loser President ma-
terializes-and I predict we would-why are we now just waiting 
for the inevitable accident to happen? 
